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Monday, March 23, 2015

Garrett's final--pre 'final draft'

The first volume of Italo Calvino's Cosmicomics was published in Italian in 1965, before being translated into English in 1968. The dates of these publications strike me as particularly interesting given the timeframe of the readings we have worked with this quarter. Obviously, our readings were centered around 1966, but the majority of the texts we read were not published in English until much later. I am interested in this process of delay in translation and what it means for questions of simultaneity of arrival, influence, and response. 1966 seems to me to be a year selected to organize a set of readings (or more properly a set of authors) that center on the concept of origin and return. But to treat 1966 as “origin” of anything in particular (“poststructuralism”) is already problematic, given both Ecrits and Writing and Difference are collections of works from, in some cases, decades earlier. Likewise, Writing and Difference already contains a response to Foucault's History of Madness that would have been originally given during the process of the composition of The Order of Things. All of this is to say that in thinking through the dialogue we have more or less constructed over the course of the quarter, it makes perfect sense to import another figure who, in mid 1960s, is thinking through the problems of writing, knowledge and origin, but through the language of fiction. My turn to Calvino is not motivated by any comparative interest, that is to say, this paper will not simply 'read' Cosmicomics through Lacanian, Foucauldian, or Derridian 'lenses.' If these latter lenses enter into discussion it will be to clarify—or to bring into the language of philosophy (sic?)--thought of origin and return that are located in and between the stories that comprise the first volume of Cosmicomics.
First, a few words on Cosmicomics and my interest in it. I taught “The Distance of the Moon,” the first and arguably most famous story from Cosmicomics, in my composition class this quarter. Our class was organized around the genre 'folklore,' and we treated “The Distance of the Moon,” and Cosmicomics in general, as a sort of re-writing of folk-origin stories. Such a reading goes against the most 'legible' influences on this story in particular. As Martin McLaughlin writes in his introduction to the English Complete Cosmicomics, “The Distance of the Moon” pays “homage to the fact that early Italian literature is full of descriptions of the Earth's satellite, from Dante to Ariosto, Galileo and Leopardi, all dear to the author's heart” (xii). At the same time, the story is a “telluric version of the Orpheus and Eurydice myth” (xii). Judging from these readings, origin and return are built into the very conceptual fabric of the story. The Orpheus and Eurydice myth is particularly interesting to linger on, as it suggests that the anticipation of return, of turning back to preview that lost object whose return promises a return to life, is what ultimately makes return impossible. After this double loss, too, “Among the Thracians, [Orpheus] originated/the practice of transferring the affections/to youthful males, plucking the first flower/in the brief springtime of their early manhood” (344). This double loss—the loss first of the origin and then of the return—produces queer attachment for the first time; attachment that, unlike the “permanent” pledge that binds Orpheus to Eurydice despite her two deaths, is inherently “brief” but nonetheless cyclical. A new kind of attachment and a new mode of fleeting/reoccurring endurance emerges from the fracturing of permanence. That this new temporality/affection is linked to poetry is obvious, and from the time of Ovid up through Derrida and Blanchot to today, “poetry” seems to hold a utopian possibility. The Orpheus myth reminds us, though, that this possibility is one that can only emerge from some loss or violence (whether that be the violence of the letter or the loss that jettisons the subject into the symbolic, it remains to be decided).
For Calvino, the loss of the possibility of return seems to occupy a central theoretical role in the first volume of Cosmicomics beyond its obvious position in “The Distance of the Moon.” Two other stories I will be discussing here, “A Sign in Space” and “All at One Point” are stories that reflect on the origins of signs and space itself, respectively, that are marked by origins as moments/places of embarrassment and unretrievable, contested intimacy. But I do want to begin with “The Distance of the Moon,” because it, more beautifully than the others, puts 'origin' into question—not simply as a place of loss, but as something marked by something like trace. Like the rest of the Cosmicomics, “The Distance of the Moon” begins with the assertion of a scientific “fact” that the narrator, Qfwfq, responds to with a personal anecdote. Here, I argued in my composition class this quarter, Calvino inverts the logic of creation myths, and reflecting on this inversion will be helpful for clarifying my interest in Calvino as a thinker of origin and return.
Without getting too technical or general, we can say that the logic of creation myths (those arising 'authentically' from cultures) runs something like the following. There is a need to understand some element of the world, and in order to do so connections are drawn backwards in time between things that are understood 'here and now' and those phenomena who history and origin are unknown. From this demand we see the personalities and characteristics of people and animals transposed into generative mechanisms. Understanding that such an animal behaves in such a way, and that such a natural phenomenon as the tides or the seasons function in such a way, a narrative can be created that links the two together. In this mythological situation, the present is used to theorize and comprehend the past. Such logic finds literary exploration in the late 19th and early 20th centuries with the expansion of European colonial powers (and their attendant literati) into permanent colonies in Africa and Asia, as well as the emergence of anthropology as a discipline somewhat later. The English author Rudyard Kipling makes a career of writing 'folk' fictions of English controlled portions of the Indian subcontinent. Notable amongst his publications is the volume Just So Stories for Little Children (1902), which dramatize a conversation between a narrator and his “Best Beloved” daughter who frequently interrupts the narratives with childish questions. For Kipling, these non-European origin stories, when filtered through the logic of cultural imperialism, are suited for children. The racist logic here is that the stories of 'primitive' peoples reveal a childlike mind. At the same time though, the concept of childhood is being solidified in Europe and America—so a literature specific to children that appeals to the imaginative and illogical child mind becomes an important cultural institution. The Just So Stories function as responses to implicit “why” and “how” questions—why are there tides? How did the elephant get its trunk? I contend that this question/response form is a form that the Cosmicomics implicitly responds to.
But whereas Kipling and later writers reify European rationalism through the production of a primitive/childish literature (through which civilization and adulthood come into being), Calvino's begins with the final step (science) and constructs stories that reveal the tensions, both structural and intersubjective, built into the apparently objective signs of science. The individual Cosmicomics do not open with an explicit or even an implied question as Kipling's Just So Stories do. Rather, they begin with statements of scientific fact (regardless of the actual veracity of the fact). Consider the beginning of “The Distance of the Moon”: At one time, according to Sir George H. Darwin, the Moon was very close to the Earth. Then the tides gradually pushed her far away: the tides that the moon herself causes in the Earth's waters, where the Earth slowly loses energy (3). Blanchot can help us think through the difference between what Calvino is doing and what, to stick with my example, Kipling does in Just So Stories. Blanchot considers the difference between a statement and a question and response that apparently convey the same information.

Let us take two modes of expression: “The sky is blue,” “Is the sky blue? Yes.” One need be no great scholar to recognize what separates them. The “Yes” does not at all restore the simplicity of the flat affirmation; in the question the blue of the sky has given way to the void. The blue however, has not dissipated. On the contrary, it has been raised dramatically up to its possibility: beyond its being and unfolding in the intensity of this new space, certainly more blue than it has ever been, in a more intimate relations with the sky, in the instant—the instant of the question where everything is in instancy. (13)

For Blanchot, the question introduces a “void” into the proposition, a void that the affirmative “yes” does not “restore” to the level of statement. In the “instant of the question,” “possibility” is brought forth—but in the answer the question and the possibility of states beyond immediate or apparent existence “is terminated, closed again by the answer” (13). Thus, stories like Kipling's, which prolong the “yes” of affirmation over the course of an 'imaginative' narrative in effect closes off the creative impulse, the opening instance of the question “why?”. These stories progress from question to answer, so while they take on a form of imaginative possibility that exceed simply making up a story without a clear or even murky “how” or “why,” through their underlying logic they reject the possibility as both childish and primitive, reaffirming, ultimately, the primacy of the yes. Calvino, I think, is doing something different. Calvino begins, in essence, with the “flat affirmation” of a statement and forces the question into existence through the creation of a narrative. Calvino's stories uniformly end with improper endings—with irresolutions that serve, like the resolutions of Kipling's stories, as the grounds for experience in general. In a certain sense, we can interpret Calvino's subversion of the questioning logic as a kind of critique of scientific positivism, for he essentially positions myths and scientific explanations on the same plane; both serve to explain elements of the world to which human knowledge does not have immediate access. More subtly though, Calvino's stories insist that even after “flat affirmation” there can only be something else—some response, some further question, some relation to a time before the statement and the question were articulated from each other that can neither be thought nor even intuited. For Calvino then, the conversation of the Cosmicomics is not between an old narrator and a young audience in a traditional sense. To be sure, Qfwfq is as old as the universe itself, though he experiences multiple periods of youth depending on the demands of the particular story. Instead, Cosmicomics presents a series of origins for different phenomena that appear already formed elsewhere, earlier in time, perhaps in contradictory modes. If there is no chrono-logic to the Cosmicomics though, there is a strong emphasis on temporality as experience of a loss that has already happened, a loss that instigates the beginning of presence in any conceivable sense.
This logic plays out with different inflections in the various Cosmicomics. “The Distance of the Moon,” for example, can be read as an origin story for the importance of the moon (in Italian literature, for Calvino), not of the moon or the tides themselves. This is the origin of a signification then. In “The Distance of the Moon” it is the Captain's lost wife who “makes the Moon the Moon,” she who “sets the dogs howling all night long, and me with them” (19). “The Distance of the Moon” is thus a story of the experience of loss and of the transition of significance from one object to another. Calvino redoubles this narrative experience in the metaphor of the tides. The driving impetus of the conflict of the story is the Moon's recession from the Earth. At the story's beginning, the two bodies are close enough together that Qfwfq and his family are able to clamber up a ladder on a boat and pass from the Earth's gravitational pull to the Moon's in order to harvest “Moon-milk” from the Moon's surface. But, as the scientific overture already informs us, the tides that the Moon creates will push the Moon away from the Earth. Thus the energy that passes between two poles—here the Moon and the Earth, differentiated but not yet differentiated in the way they are 'today'-- is in fact created by the movement of the two poles and begins to constitute its own force, the tides. The tides are both the result and the cause of the same difference. They are movement, then, without beginning or end, that emerges and accelerates from the smallest point of differentiation.
Movement then becomes the subject of the story, and its characters and literary allusions cannot be conceived without reference to this non-polar movement. Plot itself is driven by the cause/effect of the tide's pull. The narrative proper begins when Qfwfq says, “this is how the story of my love for the Captain's wife began, and my suffering” (10). The introduction of love and suffering at the same point does not bear comment, but it is interesting to note what “this” Qfwfq refers to. The paragraphs preceding the beginning of the narrative portion of the story detail the experience of transitioning from the surface of the Moon back to Earth and its gravitational orientation. Qfwfq explains:

This should give you an idea of how the influences of Earth and Moon, practically equal, fought over the space between them. I'll tell you something else: a body that descended to the Earth from the satellite was still charged for a while with lunar force and rejected the attraction of our world. Even I, big and heavy as I was: every time I had been up there, I took a while to get used to the Earth's up and its down, and the others would have to grab my arms and hold me, clinging in a bunch in the swaying boat while I still had my head hanging and my legs stretching up towards the sky. (10)

In these moments of inverted/suspended gravity, Qfwfq sometimes “ended up by seizing one of Mrs Vhd Vhd's breasts, which were round and firm and the contact was good and secure and had an attraction as strong as the Moon's or even stronger”(10). Love becomes a grounding force within the non-pull of the space between Earth and Moon. At the same time, or more properly, later, love is what invests the apparently natural phenomenon with value, and thus throws it into something like narrative possibility. Once he begins to love Mrs Vhd Vhd, Qfwfq realizes that she is in love with his deaf cousin, who in turn is in love the Moon. Qfwfq imagines at first that his conflict will be between himself and Mrs Vhd Vhd's husband, the captain of the boat from which they clamber to the Moon, but the Captain is unconcerned by Qfwfq's intentions and his wife's love for the deaf cousin. Instead, the plot progresses through a series of encounters between the characters where the deaf cousin's aloofness and monomania (in his love for the moon) persistently foil Qfwfq's attempts to communicate his love for the Captain's wife. The story's central crisis precipitates on the first night that the Moon's movement away from the Earth is detectible. The Moon begins to recede too rapidly, nearly stranding the deaf cousin and the other Moon-milk harvesters. Mrs Vhd Vhd is unable to return to the boat because she had attempted to follow the deaf cousin to his hiding places on the Moon's surface. Qfwfq leaps from the boat and swims to her through the air, finally landing on the surface of the Moon to wait out its month-long orbit with the Captain's wife.
But as the next encounter with the Earth arrives, Qfwfq realizes that the two bodies will not pass close enough to pass between. Instead of the traditional ladders, the boats raise a long bamboo pole, which the deaf cousin uses, not for rescue, but rather to push the Moon farther away. Qfwfq recalls, “he wanted to show her to her more distant orbit. And this, too, was just like him: he was unable to conceive desires that went agains the Moon's nature, the Moon's course and destiny, and if the Moon now tended to go away from him, then he would take delight in this separation just as, till now, he had delighted in the Moon's nearness” (17). Mrs Vhd Vhd, recognizing the deaf cousin's intention and through it the impossibility of his loving her, decides that “if what my cousin now loved was the distant Moon, then she too would remain distant, on the Moon” (18). But for Qfwfq there is something formally different about his dissatisfaction. Rather than losing the object of his desire as the deaf cousin loses the moon or Mrs Vhd Vhd loses the cousin, Qfwq loses the network that made his object (Mrs Vhd Vhd) desirable. He writes,

It was the Earth that caused each of us to be that someone he was rather than someone else; up there, wrested from the Earth, it was as if I were no longer that I, nor she that She, for me. I was eager to return to the Earth, and I trembled at the fear of having lost it. The fulfilment of my dream of love had lasted only that instant when we had been united, spinning between Earth and Moon; torn from its earthyl soil, my love now knew only the heart-rending nostalgia for what it lacked: a where, a surrounding, a before, an after. (16)

Mrs Vhd Vhd's assimilation into the Moon constitutes a return to a new Earthly order, though the gravitational no-man's-land is replaced by the howls of dogs and the “slow arpeggios” of Mrs Vhd Vhd's harp (18). The creation of space as a void, as separation, allows it to be filled with the significant signs of desire—music and howling.
A similar motif appears in “All at One Point,” in which the inhabitants of the universe when it existed as a single point in space recall their fellow pre-Big Bang resident, Mrs. Ph(i)nko. The premise of this story is that “Through the calculations begun by Edwin P. Hubble on the galaxies' velocity of recession, we can establish the moment when all the universe's matter was concentrated in a single point, before it began to expand in space” (43). Calvino turns this seemingly one directional trajectory into a meditation on the return to an absolute origin. Qfwfq encounters a fellow single-point resident, Mr Pbert Pberd, at a bar. The two fall to discussing the people they have known and whether they will meet any of them again. Qfwfq reveals, “this theory that the universe, after having reached an extremity of rarefaction, will be condensed again has never convinced me. Any yet many of us are counting only on that, continually making plans for the time when we'll all be back there again” (45). Calvino draws a connection between personal desires for homecoming with a possible teleology of the universe, one that Qfwfq finds unconvincing (though desirable). By doing so Calvino finds a way to think through origin in general, and indeed this origin is inseparable from a trace of differentiation whose realization becomes both time and space.
I'm going to quote at length the final paragraphs of the story because they cannot be paraphrased in any meaningful way. Qfwfq reflects on the overwhelming desirability of Mrs Ph(i)nko:

And all of this, which was true of me, was true also for each of the others. And for her: she contained and was contained with equal happiness, and she welcomed us and loved and inhabited all equally.
We got along so well all together, so well that something extraordinary was bound to happen. It was enough for her to say, at a certain moment: 'Oh if I only had some room, how I'd like to make some tagliatelle for you boys!' And in that moment we all thought of the space that her round arms would occupy, moving backwards and forwards with the rolling pin over the dough, her bosom leaning over the great mound of flour and eggs which cluttered the wide board while her arms kneaded and kneaded, white and shiny with oil up to the elbows; we thought of the space that the flour would occupy, and the wheat for the flour, and the fields to raise the wheat, and the mountains from which the water would flow to irrigate the fields, and the grazing lands for the herds of calves that would give their meat for the sauce; of the space it would take for the Sun to arrive with its rays, to ripen the wheat; of the space for the Sun to condense from the clouds of stellar gases and burn; of the quantities of stars and galaxies and galactic masses in flight through space which would be needed to hold suspended every galaxy, every nebula, every sun, every planet, and at the same time we thought of it, this space was inevitably being formed, at the same time that Mrs Ph(i)nko was uttering those words: '...ah, what tagliatelle, boys!' the point that contained her and all of us was expanding in a halo of distance in light-years and light-centuries and billions of light-millennia, and we were being hurled to the four corners of the universe (Mr Pbert Pberd all the way to Pavia), and she, dissolved into I don't know what kind of energy-light-heat, she, Mrs Ph(i)nko, she who in the midst of our closed, petty world had been capable of a generous impulse, 'Boys, the tagliatelle I would make for you!', a true outburst of general love, initiating at the same moment the concept of space and, properly speaking, space itself, and time, and universal gravitation, and the gravitating universe, making possible billions and billions of suns, and of planets, and fields of wheat, and Mrs Ph(i)nkos, scattered through the continents of the planets, kneading with floury, oil shiny, generous arms, and she lost at that very moment, and we, mourning her loss. (47-48)
After the first iteration of the tagliatelle utterance the prose descends into an almost endlessly grammatically deferred sentence. At this moment that space and time emerge in the history of the universe, language itself begins to expand both spatially and temporally. Calvino works to represent what this creation of the concept of space would entail—beginning with Mrs Ph(i)nko directly working the pasta dough in her hands, slowly abstracting and moving outward back through the process of the pasta's production: the flour, the wheat, the fields, the ecosystem, the solar system, the galaxy and finally the entire universe all held together by Mrs Ph(i)nko's generous language. While Qfwfq denies the possibility of the universe collapsing back to is original spot—to the original experience of co-containing Mrs Ph(i)nko—memory itself follows such a trajectory, but inverted (though not quite inverted—not sure there's really a word for what he does). Qfwfq's memory begins with a single point and expands outward to encompass the whole universe, though chronologically the tagliatelle is the final product of the process of universe production. The beginning is the end; the beginning is already contained in, anticipated by, precipitated by the end. But the end is never reached. Mrs Ph(i)nko dissolves into something unknowable—energy—“lost at that very moment” that “a generous impulse...a true outburst of general love” first comes into possibility.
Like he is at the conclusion of “The Distance of the Moon,” Qfwfq is left mourning at the “very moment” the woman he desires is transformed by desire into something else. “All at One Point” thus reiterate elements of the narrative of “The Distance of the Moon,” but instead of discovering the origin of sorrow and consequently of signification, we find here a more original origin at which point thought and action, sign and space are created in the same “generous” moment. The purely sexual feminine figure of “The Distance of the Moon” is transformed into the sensual yet maternal Mrs Ph(i)nko. Qfwfq writes, “The fact that she went to bed with her friend Mr De Xuaeaux was well known. But in a point, if there's a bed, it takes up the whole point, so it isn't a question of going to bed, but if being there, because anybody in the point is also in the bed. Consequently, it was inevitable that she should be in bed also with each of us” (46). Mrs Ph(i)nko's sexuality is everpresent and all encompassing, but there is nonetheless a sense of separation. Though she is in bed with everyone, she only went to bed with Mr De Xuaeaux. Her erotic energy, what we can call her desire, is thus directed towards a certain end that maintains the continuity of all space in the point despite creating separation within it (those who are going to bed and those who are not). Calvino creates a primal difference along other lines as well. There is the “cleaning woman--'maintenance staff' she was called” and the “family of immigrants by the name of Z'zu” who are marked respectively by their labor and their ethnicity (though as Calvino notes, neither of these concepts were meaningful since on the one hand there is no cleaning to do in a single point and likewise nowhere to immigrate from). But while the cleaning woman with her gossip and the Z'zus with their strange ways sow social discord (that likewise maintains the social cohesion of the other point inhabitants), Mrs Ph(i)nko and her feminine capaciousness tears everything apart while attempting to hold it all together. Mrs Ph(i)nko's innovation is a maternal impulse—care—signaled by her designation of Qfwfq and the others as “boys.”

 But at the same time this maternal attraction remains inseparable from her erotic attraction, and it is perhaps this contradiction that causes the point with its utter subjective saturation to explode. Qfwfq explains, “With her it was different: the happiness I derived from her was the joy of being concealed, punctiform, in her, and of protecting her, punctiform, in me; it was at the same time vicious contemplation (thanks to the promiscuity of the punctiform convergence of us all in her) and also chastity (given her punctiform impenetrability). In short, what more could I ask?” (46-47) The answer to this question “what more could I ask?” is given by the creation of literally more, of the 'more' as a concept. Thus for Qfwfq (if not for Calvino) the feminine provides two modes of thinking attraction and attachment, and two modes of origin. Generosity as the first aspect of being, desire as the first aspect of signification. It is the wanting of Mrs Ph(i)nko through the desire for the tagliatelle that brings not only the physical elements of the universe into existence, but also their causal relationality, their metonymic proximity that makes the universe desirable so that it can produce the tagliatelle. This metnonymy is subtended by a primary metaphor, Tagliatelle for Mrs Ph(i)nko. Though in the case of both “The Distance of the Moon” and “All at One Point” the primary feminine metaphor is also a metonomy. Metaphor gets to the heart of desire though it operates within the system of metonymy.

Thursday, February 26, 2015

Entry-Point to "Freud and the Scene": Detour in "Le Facteur de la Verité."

Much of the critique of Lacan in the Postcard essay rests upon a critique of the way in which detour/deferral/prolonging functions, and that's the starting point of "Freud and the Scene". Sometimes Derrida will say that difference is conceived of as a "detour between two presences," the operation of a transition without loss or remainder ("Lacan leads us back to the truth, to a truth which cannot be lost"). This is one thing he accuses Lacan of; the letter has a predetermined itinerary: it will always arrive. The signifier, whose displacement, for Lacan, "determines the subject in their acts", [h]as a locality... "a certain locality which is itself non-empirical and non-real since it gives rise to that which is not where it is, that which is "missing from its place" (424). In service of this, Lacan's signifier leaves remainders: surpluses, the Minister and Dupin's letters. They are marks. Derrida notes that the phallus as signifier le manque a sa place sounds the same whether as "the lack in its place", or "the lack has its place". Ordered as it is by a lack, "the letter will always re-find its proper place, a circumvented lack (a transcendental one), the letter will be where it always will have been, always should have been, indestructible and intangible via the detour of a proper, and properly circular itinerary" (424). I think this allows Derrida to say that the lack is a signified, which means he can connect that to his broader critique of the "Seminar" which is that, in focussing on content and thus meaning only, misses the scene of writing. This is only possible because, "the displacement of the signifier, therefore is analyzed as signified [as content and as meaning], as the recounted object of a short story" (427). This is clear from the exclusion of the narrator from Lacan's triad. So Derrida will say, "one must take into account the remainder, that which can fall, and one must do so not only in the narrated content of the writing (the signifier, the written, the letter) but in the operation of writing" (436). Truth (Lacan's concern is the truth of the purloined letter, which is the truth of the purloined letter..) is only lost temporally, in a "non-delivery", to-be-re-appropriated. This is directly tied to Derrida's critique of circulation in a restricted economy, which can allow for displacement and substitution, but only in the service of a return. 

This critique seems radical in that the Lacanian insistence is that "the signifier has no place identical to itself," yet Derrida shows it necessarily returns and remains what it is en route—it's both self-identical and has a "proper place". But it is also not self-identical, or it's self-identical in not being self-identical (I think this is how to read the fixity that Derrida ascribes to Lacan's conception): "veiling/unveiling here concerns a hole, a non-being, the truth of being as non-being. The truth is "woman" as veiled/unveiled castration. This is where the signifier (its adequation with the signified) gets underway, this is the site of the signifier, the letter. But this is also where the trial begins, the promise of reappropriation, of return, of readequation: [Lacan:] "the search for and restitution of the object" (439). The movement of the signifier, as phallus, "[returns] to the sender, who is not the signer of the note, but the place where it began to detach itself from its possessor or feminine letagee" (440). So again, the lack is fixed and governs the economy as a transcendental signified: "That which is missing from its place has in castration a fixed, central place, freed from all substitution. Something is missing from its place, but the lack is never missing from it. The phallus, thanks to castration, always remains in its place, in the transcendental topology. In castration the phallus is indivisible, and therefore indestructible, like the letter which takes its place" (440). Taking the phallus's place, the letter (signifier), subjects all to its truth: the truth of castration, which is also femininity. Femininity is the best figure of castration "because, in the logic of the signifier, it is always already been castrated; and femininity "leaves" something in circulation (here the letter), something detached from itself in order to have it brought back to itself" (442). The supplement that Derrida says overflows the Lacanian economy, the fourth side, is the text itself; an unclaimed remainder, rather than a surplus-value. It is the text itself that must be seen to produce the frame of Lacan's inquiry ("not the map that the text describes, but the map that the text "is"). What Derrida says is that for the very idea of delivery you must have the structural possibility of its non-delivery, otherwise the concept wouldn't be delivery it would be something like a pure reception—"without this threat [capability of not-arriving], the circuit of the letter would not even have begun" (444). So to even conceive of the letter arriving, before even the notion that it always arrives, you have to take into account deviation and remaining: poste resante, "remaining mail". 

This is a similar move to the one he makes in relation to profit, the idea of profit couldn't exist without the idea of loss. Dialectics, in its attempt to always profit, to reappropriate loss, misses the originary possibility of difference which doesn't oppose profit to loss, but shows that loss is always supplementary to profit. So the difference of movement, emerge from a deferral. But a deferral separated from the guarantee of arrival/return/profit. That's the scene of writing for him, I think. "Not that the letter never arrives at its destination, but it belongs to the structure of the letter to be capable always, of not arriving. And without this threat, the circuit of the letter would not even have begun. But with this threat the circuit can always not finish... Here dissemination threatens the law of the signifier and of the castration as the contract of truth. It broaches, breaches, the unity of the signifier, that is, of the phallus."

Questions and quotes for "Genesis and Structure":



  • - how is aspiring to a “continuity of explication [that] must dispel the shadow of a choice” different than speculative closure?
  • - "There are layers of meaning which appear as systems, or complexes, or static configurations, within which, moreover, are possible a movement and a genesis which must obey both the legality to and the functional significance of the structure under consideration. Other layers, sometimes more profound, sometimes more superficial, are given in the essential mode of creation and movement, that is, in the modes of primordial origin, or becoming, or of tradition; and these require that in speaking of them one use the language of genesis, supposing that there is one, or that there is only one."
    • These are incommensurate because of a lack of an ability to think of an immanent genetic movement
  • - There's a doubleness Derrida notes in the way that Husserl thinks of genesis: both as "the true meaning, the authentic and original meaning of set theory and number theory" and also as a return to the spontaneity of the "activities of colligation and numeration in which collections ('totalities', 'sets') are given in an originally productive way."
    • This doubleness indicates a tension between the spontaneous activity of generation and its necessary truth-value or -determination
    • Derrida anticipates the counter-claim to his critique, that Husserl was not driving at a "transcendental genesis" except, naively - at least initially, as a "psychological genesis" with its own "structural a prioris". 
    • While Husserl might have conceived as genesis and structure as always complementary and inseparable, Derrida wants to get at a play between these concepts that underlies phenomenological thought, one which drives its reductions and leaves "every major stage of phenomenology" unbalanced in an endless oscillation that will never succeed in reactivation, but only in the perpetuation of phenomenology's own movement.
    • In fact, Husserl's project can be conceived of simply as a "metaphysics of history" which relies on the "solid structure of a Telos" to allow the illusion of an untamed, but delimited, "genesis" to appear. This is the same metaphysics of a dead structure haunted by spirit that the phenomenological reduction intended to escape. And yet, this failure of the attempt to reconcile the "structuralist" and "genetic" demands might be what gave rise to phenomenology in the first place, as a science doomed to endlessly repeat its original failure.
  • Husserl's phenomenology is irreducible to psychologism or some "autonomy of logical ideality as concerns all consciousness in general" because Husserl, "for his part, seeks to maintain simultaneously the normative autonomy of logical or mathematical ideality as concerns all factual consciousness, and its original dependence in relation to a subjcetivity in general; in general, but concretely." In order to walk the line between what, for him, were two traps of thought, he had to insist on a "concrete, but nonempirical, intentionality, a 'transcendental experience' which would be 'constitutive,' that is, like all intentionality, simultaneously productive and revelatory, active and passivity."
  • The insistence on this synthetic (in one sense of the word) position doesn't eliminate the problem of "the foundation of objectivity"
  • Husserl's critique of Dilthey's confusion of "the truths of fact and the truths of reason" can also be used to understand the limits of a phenomenology."Pure truth or the pretension to pure truth is missed in its meaning as soon as one attempts, as Dilthey does, to account for it from within a determined historical totality, that is, from within a factual totality, a finite totality all of whose manifestations and cultural productions are structurally solidary and coherent, and are al regulated by the same function, by the same finite unity of a total subjectivity."
  • Derrida writes, "What I can never understand, in a structure, is that by means of which it is not closed," where it is sutured, to an infinite subjective opening on truth. Husserl, by noting the structurality of such an opening is unable to eliminate this epistemological problem.
  • " History does not cease to be an empirical science of 'facts' because it has reformed its methods and techniques, or because it has substituted a comprehensive structuralism for causalism, atomism, and naturalism, or because it has become more attentive to cultural totalities. Its pretension to founding normativity on a better understood factuality does not become more legitimate, but only increases its powers of philosophical seduction. A confuion of values and existence, and more generally, of all types of realities and all types of idealities is sheltered beneath the equivocal category of the historical."
  • “The exigencies of life demand that a practical response precede an absolute science whose conclusions it cannot await.” — This alludes to the problem of the temporality of totalization, which is always one of the simultaneous necessity of anticipation and impossibility of deferral
  • ‘Thus, if Husserl distinguishes between empirical and eidetic structure on the one hand, and between empirical and eidetic-transcendental structure on the other, at this time he as not yet taken the same step as concerns genesis.”
  • Part of the reason for this hesitation is the admitted lack of exactitude of “the essences of pure consciousness” because of the difficulty of identifying an “abstract eidetic element” that can transition to the limit. Such an identification would require the possibility of closure. (footnote 14)
  • The genetic element cannot be closed off without Husserl resorting to some kind of abstract psychologism that he wants to resist. “… the opening to the ‘as such’ of Being and to the determination of the totality of regions in general, cannot be described, stricto sensu and simply, on the basis of a determined regional structure.” The opening that the noematic element of the object (as experienced in thought) is the pole of “pure passivity” which must leave consciousness open and receptive to the world.
  • Phenomenology, then, must remain open to a metaphysics of presence unless it were to embrace the possibility of a “structuralist psychology” parallel to the movement of transcendental phenomenology. 
  • “This distance which must separate a phenomenological psychology from a transcendental phenomenology” is precisely what registers as “nothing” to the phenomenologizing consciousness. This nothing is the space of appearance of meaning, and would have to be dealt with by a “genetic phenomenology” which would totalize genesis, distilling off the moment of passivity that must be left as an opening for phenomenology to function. This instance of self-division (for JD the difference between speaking and writing) is both what conditions a phenomenology, and prevents it from suturing the (non-)gap between genesis and structure that allows for metaphysics.
  • “… in criticizing classical metaphysics, phenomenology accomplishes the most profound project of metaphysics”.
  • “… to ask oneself about the meaning of the notions of structure or genesis in general, before the dissociations introduced by reduction, is to interrogate that which precedes the transcendental reduction.”
  • Just as for Lacan, memory is not a condition of repetition but one of its syntactic effects, likewise, "The question of the possibility of the transcendental reduction cannot expect an answer" because it is from the repetition of "the question of the possibility of that question" that the illusion of an answer arises and defers itself.

Thursday, February 12, 2015



Throughout the essays of Derrida that we have read, his writing seeks to free the verb from all the other forms of conceptualizing language that restrict it (cf. Foucault 1989: 104 et passim). In that the creative force of being itself will always move faster than the signs with which we try to catch and categorize it, Derrida sees written representation as always at variance with the thing that it represents.  Even the verb “to be” enacts the strangulation of life outside of language each time we voice it. However, unlike Foucault, Derrida unequivocally views the reconciliation of being and language as neither possible nor desirable.  For him, we only move toward the evocatively defined “invisible interior of poetic freedom” (1978: 7) by throwing ourselves beyond the origin of language.  While he agrees with Nietzsche that language reduces life to language in the translation of drawing breath into the verb “to be” he does not want us to see this movement as the origin of either metaphor or language (383 ad 7). Rather, from within the confines of representation, Derrida urges us to find freedom in the irreducibility of life to language and the infinite play of signs that emerge from the space between the two.  

                Given that this critique of representation relies on discrediting the fixed relation between signifier and signified, it is no surprise that “Structure, Sign, and Play” begins with an abusive appropriation of an author, Montaigne, and text, “On Experience,” with which he engages throughout but nowhere else names. With his attribution of the proclamation “we need to interpret interpretations more than to interpret things” to Montaigne, Derrida not only inserts a period that the original does not contain so as conceal the fact that he has taken it out of context, he entirely reverses the meaning of the original. Whereas Derrida would have us believe that Montaigne wants us to engage with representation as the only medium through which thing can be known, the original tells us to the contrary that “there is more trouble in interpreting interpretations than in interpreting the things themselves, and there are more books on books than on any other subject” (1993: 349). Yet, this in no way diminishes the argument that Derrida will make and more to the point puts into practice the form of destructive reading that he offers us. If Claude Levi Strauss’ primary failure resides in the fact that he will always “preserve as an instrument something whose truth value he criticizes” (1978: 359), then we can read Derrida as critiquing the instrumentalization of truth as value by casting it out.

With this form of reading, Derrida evokes the tradition of western thought apophatically and at a variance so as to resist the call of truth value towards which critique risks reverting. Derrida makes this danger clear when he writes that one cannot simply expel the sign from metaphysics because the concepts of metaphysics are  not "atoms" but systems . If we borrow from it in order to overturn it, we must be aware that each one its elements  "brings along with it the whole of metaphysics." For Derrida, the sign that the philosopher sought to do away with will now reaper as the dark center of her new system. It is for this reason that we must take the whole of the preceding system into account and discover where it has failed to reduce sign to thought: in the case of metaphysics the sensible to the intelligible (355). We can see this at play in the founding moment of metaphysics in which the transcendent Forms (eidoi) that Aristotle rejects in Plato suddenly become his shadowy notion of substance (ousia) which predicates (arche kai aitia) being (to on) in the process of becoming (to gignesthai).  For Derrida, the crisis that metaphysics constantly suffers repeats the fact that Aristotle's attempt to bring Plato's distant intelligible forms back into the sensible world ultimately displaces them into the very fiber of sensible experience. This process cycles throughout the history of thought and accounts for Husserl's return to Plato through phenomenology and Heidegger's critique of him through the pre-socratics (32). 

               This then leads us into a second trap at the base of western philosophy, the history of thought itself or the structure of thought as its self-knowledge. As soon as thought takes itself as its object in relation to nature and the various signs that represent culture, its history becomes that of the struggle between the two poles of that relation: we can think of Latour's recent argument that nature and culture are one object-one which just so happens to look a lot like western culture. Before Plato, Gorgias had already called language "a powerful drug" which forces us to believe in notions that have no basis in reality but never-the-less determine our thoughts and actions (vid. Encomium of Helen).  Derrida's evocation of the sophists here not only causes us to realize that they had problematized the forms of knowledge (technai) that would make Plato's system possible in advance of it, but that paradoxically Plato's system could not exist without their critique and the need for a beyond writing that it generated. 

 Derrida's paradoxical view of relationship of thought to structure implies that the spontaneous aporia which arise within western philosophy are neither generated by one nor the other,  but are endemic to the writing in which they are conveyed. In so far as we have never unearthed the dark passage of history at which life became metaphor,  the origin of history (419), writing has always taken as its object "emptiness as the situation of literature"  (8). Yet, this emptiness is not sterile. Derrida tells us that "writing is the outlet as the descent of meaning outside itself within itself" and the sole definition of knowledge (34). Like Zarathustra's Untergang (down-going; destruction, 35) into life and the pure force of Dionysian inspiration "tears out its eyes" at the emergence of its Apollonian double (representation), Derrida would have us write compulsively with the knowledge of our failure presupposed. Contrary to this form of writing, Derrida offers us the structuralist Rousset who understood "theatrical or novelistic movement as Aristotle understood movement in general," reducible to a teleological structure (24). 

           We can return now to Montaigne and the passage that Derrida abused...   like Derrida he argues that metaphysic's failure to see its own ground or lack there of has caused its systems to swirl around their inane (or kenos) as an "infinity of atoms" whose dissonance forces us towards a new form of writing that  "looks upon itself" (1993: 349), the essay....
Democritus and Heraclitus were two philosophers, of whom the first, finding the human state vain and ridiculous, never appeared in public except with a mocking and ribald expression. Heraclitus, on the other hand, felt pity and compassion for this state of ours, so his expression was always melancholy and his eyes full of tears. 
 Alter/ ridebat, quoties a limine moverat unum/ protuleratque pedem; flebat contrarius alter
 I prefer the first humour, not because it is pleasanter to laugh than to weep, but because it expresses more contempt and is more condemnatory of us than the other. I do not think we can ever be despised as much as we deserve. Wailing and commiseration imply some valuation of the object bewailed; what we mock at we consider worthless. There is, in my opinion, not so much misery in us as emptiness, not so much malice as folly (132-3).


 LACUNA, ARGUMENT, THINGS. 

       Provocatively, Foucault uses the same Montaigne passage with which Derrida begins "Structure, Sign, and Play" in order to advance his idea that in the 16th century knowledge "consisted in relating one form of language to another form of language; in restoring the great, unbroken plain of words and things; in making everything speak" (1989: 44).  

More on what Foucault is doing. 

       I argue that Foucault and Derrida both see radical potential  in Montaigne's moment of epistemic disorientation into which Descartes will insert the Cogito. However, both see within Montaigne the impasse of  a scandalous modern  subjectivity as an "enslaved sovereign" (1989: 340) pinioned to a notion of a progressive history of ideas that paradoxically affirms and denies its agency (cf. 361). ...

LACUNA, ARGUMENT, THINGS. 


TBC

Monday, January 19, 2015

Week 1: Benjamin/Derrida

As Weber points out in the opening pages, Benjamin seems interested in figures of non-movement (standstill; freezing; arrest; shock). There is a sense in which Benjamin preferences form, much as Derrida points out in structuralism: "one can glance over the totality divested of its forces even if it is the totality of form and meaning, for what is in question, in this case, is meaning rethought as form" (5). I think for Benjamin there is a sense that this is a historical problem to do with the transmission of meaning, or the possibility of representation. So that the work of interpretation begins in the construction/recognition of critical form (Derrida seems to treat this more as a structuralist convenience: "structures appear more clearly when content, which is the living energy of meaning, is neutralized", whereas for Benjamin the neutralization could be socio-historical). Along these lines, I've been thinking a lot about the second half of this famous quote from "Theses on the Concept of History": "There is no document of culture which is not at the same time a document of barbarism. And just as such a document is never free of barbarism, so barbarism taints the manner in which it was transmitted from one hand to another. The historical materialist therefore dissociates himself from the process of transmission as much as possible." In thinking about a dissociation from transmission, I'm thinking about how for WB allegory appears in the ruin of symbol, and in a related way, how ideas work in the fracturing (or constellating) of concepts. It's obvious for Benjamin that allegory doesn't overcome symbol, but exists rather in its aftermath—allegory is the Nachleben of the symbol.

I think this came through in Weber's sense that origin is a historical rather than a logical category for Benjamin, at once a coming-to-be and passing-away (containing both the previous form and the one that is in relation to it). For me the image of the eddy [Strudel] was useful, taking it as both the swirling of fluid, like an accumulation, and, the reverse current that is created when that fluid flows past an obstacle, creating a space devoid of flow on the downstream side of the object. I was thinking of history, what has passed-away, for Benjamin as this accumulation. And I was thinking of what has come to be in this almost paradoxical space of one "devoid of flow". It's something in the arrest of that which has passed-away that prevents that which is present, coming next, or having come-to-be, asserting itself in a progressive temporality, so it stands still: "The historical materialist cannot do without a notion of the present which is not a transition, but in which times takes a stand, and has come to a standstill" ("Theses"). And the arrest is this claim of the past, "we are endowed with a weak messianic power, to which the past has a claim" ("Theses"). History no longer having the form of historical movement that consists in passing.

I'm interested in the way in which Benjamin is concerned with the association of history with the rhetoric of the "new", and as such, how futurity merely becomes a projective space of the present, which legitimates projects and temporalities of continuation (thus nothing actually "new"). Continuation, or historicism—making the past legible, not citable, to, and as, a universalism (i.e. taking only the qualities that support such a universalism)—has very little to do with history. Benjamin will say history can only transcribe itself in allegory, or in the ruin of symbolic language (cf. Origin German Tragic Drama, p.158-167). So thinking with his point that "ideas are to concepts, as constellations are to stars" from OGTD, it's something in the fracture of conceptual language—and it's in that fracture that historical representation can take place. Things that exists with symbolic weight/meaning are often described as "monuments", and in this sense ruins are the fracturing of monuments: "ruins are in the realm of things, what allegories are in the realm of thoughts" (OGTD). This seemed to me a similar place to where Derrida began when talking about structuralism, at a moment of its height, like the forethought (which is also thereby, the thought) of its monumentalization. Thereby taking structuralism as a kind of monument: "If it recedes one day". It seemed to me where deconstruction sets to work is a similar place to where allegory would; where something is established in (almost) the same move as it is shown to be at its limit (a form of dialectics), something in the mode of establishment itself seems important.

Along these lines—a starting point which is also an aftermath—I was really intrigued by the metaphor of the city (already a metaphor for site and structure) and how it is linked to structure's appearance, or darstellbarkeit (representability): "Somewhat like architecture of an uninhabited or deserted city, reduced to a skeleton by some catastrophe of nature or art. A city no longer inhabited, not simply left behind, but haunted by meaning and culture. This state of being haunted, which keeps the city from returning to nature, is perhaps the general mode of the presence or absence of the thing itself in pure language." This seemed so Benjaminian to me, describing a kind of ruination. A "state of being haunted", is present in Weber's reading: "the dead do not depart, or if they do, it is only to return as ghosts. Instead of defining identity, death returns as the shadow that splits life into a life that consists largely in passing away, and a death like Kafka's Gracchus, has nowhere to go but back to the living" (Weber, 158). And I liked this line also: "Thus it is in no way paradoxical that the structuralist consciousness is a catastrophic consciousness, simultaneously destroyed and destructive, destructuring, as is all consciousness, or at least at the moment of decadence, which is the period proper to all movement of consciousness". "Decadence" here is really intriguing, and it made me come back to monuments and establishing, the sense of something being at its height is when it falls. I've gone on too long, but I want to quote this long section from "Paris, the Capital of the 19th Century", to get to a greater sense of the monument/ruin relation: "Balzac was the first to speak of the ruins of the bourgeoisie. But it was surrealism that first opened our eyes to them. The development of the forces of production shattered the wish symbols of the previous century, even before the monuments representing them had collapsed. In the 19C this development worked to emancipate the forms of construction from art, just as in the 16C sciences freed themselves from philosophy. A start is made with architecture as engineered construction. Then comes the reproduction of nature as photography. The creation of fantasy prepares to becomes practical as commercial art. Literature submits to montage in the feuillton. All these products are on the point of entering the market as commodities. But they linger on the threshold. From this epoch derive the arcades and interieurs, the exhibition halls and the panoramas. They are residues of a dream world. The realization of dream elements in the course of waking up, is the paradigm of dialectical thinking. Thus dialectical thinking is the organ of historical awakening. Every epoch, in fact, not only dreams the one to follow [Chris: seeming inversion of Marx's, "Mankind thus inevitably sets itself only such tasks as it is able to solve, since closer examination will always show that the problem itself arises only when the material conditions for its solution are already present or at least in the course of formation." from "Preface to Contribution of the Critique of Political Economy"] but, in dreaming, precipitates its awakening. It bears its end within itself and unfolds it—as Hegel already noticed, by cunning. With the destabilizing of the market economy, we begin to recognize the monuments of the bourgeoisie as ruins even before they have crumbled" (Aracdes Project, 9).

This maybe gets to the problem of signification. Benjamin needs a monument to see ruins, again: "ruins are in the realm of things, what allegories are in the realm of thoughts". In Acts of Religion Derrida says this about monuments: "One cannot love a monument, a work of architecture, an institution as such except in ruin". The difficulty is that as soon as one symbolizes the ruin—as soon as one desires to name and identify it—one changes the ruin into something else, that's Benjamin's argument as I take it (as soon as the ruin is symbolized (so not allegory) as ruin it becomes something other than ruin. In this sense it becomes a monument ). It seems like a analagous point to Derrida's point in "Force", that in the end structuralism cannot account for the metaphoricity of its own site and so "stifles force under form"—it has to monumentalize itself. And so I was taking metaphoricity as a kind of force. There seems to be a question as what produces force, and writing this after week 2 that seems to be the conflict with Lacan. It's almost as if the monument produces the force, sets it off (this would where Benjamin is to me), whereas for Derrida that can't be the case, because, as in the quote, the monument is already a ruin.

Friday, January 16, 2015

Hi all

It might be less tiresome to have an actual blog site instead of, or in addition to a google doc. Plus, this would allow us to have comment threads! Feel free to post here or on the doc as you prefer.